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Abstract: Perceptual experience has representational content. My argument 
for this claim is an inference to the best explanation. The explanandum is 
cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, perceptual experiences are 
either causally influenced, or else are partially constituted, by mental states 
that are representational, including: mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and 
memories. If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there 
is a background condition for cognitive penetration that renders the 
phenomenon prima facie intelligible. Naïve realist or purely relational 
accounts of perception leave cognitive penetration less well-explained, even 
when formulated with so-called ‘standpoints’ or ‘third relata.’  
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I. Introduction 
Philosophers and psychologists increasingly recognise that there is significant interaction 
between seemingly distinct parts of the mind, with particular attention paid to interaction 
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between its perceptual and non-perceptual parts. The view of perception as a discrete 
information system that merely feeds into belief from the bottom-up is outdated. More and 
more, we are invited to recognise that there exist various top-down influences on visual, 
auditory, tactual, olfactory and gustatory experiences.1 These influencing states are diverse. 
Here I focus on mental imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories, though one might also 
consider intentions (Wu 2013) and desires (Stokes 2012). Here are some representative 
examples: 
 
Arranging Furniture Having moved into a new apartment, you are in the process of 
deciding how to arrange your furniture. You look around the 
lounge and visualise the sofa, bookcase, dining table, etc. in 
different locations. You don’t imagine the furniture in 
phenomenal space (‘the mind’s eye’). You mentally project the 
items around this very room. In doing so, you see this room to be 
a potential location for this or that piece of furniture. 
 
Dinner Party You are attending a dinner party at your boss’s house. Halfway 
through the meal, she reveals that the meat she has served is 
pigeon. You believe pigeons to be diseased-ridden vermin. But 
since you were just discussing the possibility of a pay rise, you 
resign yourself to swallowing a few mouthfuls more. Believing 
the meat to be pigeon, it now tastes different than before: more 
																																								 																				
1  This attitude is exemplified in a slew of recent research by philosophers of perception; 
see, for instance, the papers in Bennett & Hill (2014), Stokes et al. (2014) and Zeimbekis & 
Raftopoulos (2015).  
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slimy, sour and disagreeable. 
 
Jeweller Your rich aunt owns a chain of jewellery stores. On your day off, 
you agree to drive her to several of the stores so that she can 
inspect deliveries of gems. At each, she tells you at length about 
the different types of cut, pointing out marquise cuts, oval cuts, 
princess cuts, and so on. By the end of the day, you have become 
rather good at telling them apart by sight. Where before the gems 
looked to be an unordered mishmash of colour and shape, 
acquiring concepts for the different cuts of gems means that they 
now look to be marquise cut gems, oval cut gems, princess cut 
gems, and so on.    
 
Missing Laptop You are in your office, engrossed in writing a paper. Called away 
to a meeting, you dutifully attend, itching to get back to your 
work. The meeting ends and you make a bee-line back to your 
office. You swing open your office door, expecting, from 
memory, your laptop to be where you left it. But it’s not there! 
You see your laptop is gone. You don’t merely see the presence 
of the wooden desk on which it sat, you are visually stunned by 
the laptop’s absence.  
 
As one might infer from the diversity of these examples, I will be working with a broad 
notion of cognitive penetration. Although visual imagery, beliefs, concepts and memories 
have all been claimed to facilitate cognitive penetration, some might prefer to restrict use of 
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the term to cases such as Dinner Party. (The hallmarks of this case, and those like it, include 
an effect on perceptual experience that is synchronic with the forming of an occurent belief 
about the perceptual stimuli.) No matter. Dinner Party, and cases like it, will feature 
centrally here.  
 
Another sense in which my understanding of cognitive penetration might be slightly 
unorthodox is that cognitive penetration is typically discussed in causal terms. In cognitive 
penetration, cognitive states are said to influence perceptual experiences and their 
phenomenology, or produce top-down effects upon such states. Indeed, definitions of 
cognitive penetration standardly build causation into them (see Stokes 2013 for an overview) 
and may understand cognitive penetration as involving fairly indirect mechanisms 
(Macpherson 2012). I have no qualms with thinking about some cases of cognitive 
penetration in this manner. But I do not think it is helpful to understand all cases of cognitive 
penetration in this way. It vastly understates just how entwined cognition and perception may 
become in cognitive penetration to say that one produces a causal influence on the other. 
Indeed, as some of the above examples illustrate, the penetrating cognitive state sometimes 
does more than merely influence the perceptual experience and its phenomenology, but 
would appear to partially constitute it. Just what this means will hopefully become clear in 
the paragraphs that immediately follow. If one finds it objectionable to call all such 
phenomena cognitive penetration, one could instead read me as discussing some broader 
phenomenon and give it a different label, e.g., ‘top-down perceptual integration.’ Let us 
examine the examples more closely. 
 
In Arranging Furniture, your perceptual experience of the room is cognitively penetrated 
by mental images of furniture. You see the room. You visualise some furniture. But these 
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states are not unrelated. You visualise the furniture to be located in the very room you 
currently see, undergoing a hybrid visual-imaginative state sometimes called ‘make-
perceive.’ (Briscoe 2008; forthcoming) While your seeing the room per se is not constituted 
by any visual imagery, your seeing the room to be a potential location for, e.g., a bookcase, is 
partially constituted by your visualisation, and mental projection, of a bookcase into the 
room. Your seeing the room to be that way is not a mere causal effect of this mental act of 
projection, but is inseparable from it. 
 
In Dinner Party, your gustatory experience of meat is cognitively penetrated by your belief 
about what kind of meat you are eating, but in a way that is causal rather than constitutive. 
You don’t undergo a hybrid gustatory-belief state; rather, your belief that you are eating 
pigeon causally impacts your gustatory experience and its phenomenology. Your gustatory 
experience is thus cognitively penetrated in a synchronic manner by an occurently formed 
belief that you are eating pigeon.2  
 
In Jeweller, your visual experience of gems alters due to the acquiring of concepts for each 
of the types of cut you have seen. You end up with an ability to visually distinguish the 
different types of cut, having gained throughout the day a disposition to recognise each type 
of cut by sight. You undergo what might be called diachronic cognitive penetration. Whether 
this is a case in which your visual experience of the gems, i.e. how they look to you, comes to 
be partially constituted by your newly-acquired concepts, or is merely causally influenced by 
them, is not clear.  
 
																																								 																				
2  Dinner Party is not without empirical precedent. There is experimental evidence that 
influencing people’s beliefs about the origin of a sample of meat affects how sour it then 
tastes (Anderson & Barrett 2016). 
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In Missing Laptop, your visual experience of the laptop’s absence is due to the cognitive 
penetration of perception by memory. An image of your laptop in working memory is sub-
personally matched against incoming perceptual stimulus, e.g., of the table. The matching 
task fails since the laptop is not present. A perceptual experience of the laptop’s absence 
ensues (Farennikova 2013). This has been claimed to be an indirect case of cognitive 
penetration (Farennikova 2015), suggesting it is causal, rather than constitutive. Here is 
another example of memorial-perceptual cognitive penetration,3 one that is perhaps less 
controversial and which involves memory partially constituting a perceptual experience and 
its phenomenology: tactually experiencing an object’s 3-D shape in virtue of your memory 
unifying your temporally extended hand-movements over that object’s surface.  
 
I shall be arguing that cognitive penetration gives us reason to think that perceptual 
experiences have representational content. However, it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
defend cognitive penetration from its critics (see Fodor 1988; Pylyshyn 1999; Raftopoulos 
2009; Deroy 2013;	 Machery 2015; Firestone & Scholl 2016). Likewise, it is beyond this 
paper’s scope to defend each of the above types of cognitive penetration. Therefore, I will be 
arguing for the conditional that if one is attracted to a view of perception on which it may be 
cognitively penetrated in the above sorts of ways, either causally or constitutively, then one 
has reason to think that perceptual experiences have representational content. As a corollary, 
one also has reason to reject, or at least modify, purely relational views of perception, like 
standard varieties of naïve realism, on which perceptual experiences are said not to involve 
representational content as part of their fundamental nature.4  
																																								 																				
3  The example is borrowed from borrowed from Matthew Fulkerson (2014: 60), though 
Fulkerson does not explicitly analyse it as a case of cognitive penetration. 
 
4  One should also reject purely sensational views, like adverbialism. In what follows, I 
ignore such theories of perception. 
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In section II, I lay out the distinction between representationalism and naïve realism. In 
section III, I argue that representationalism provides a framework within which cognitive 
penetration is made prima facie intelligible. In section IV, I distinguish two versions of naïve 
realism: dyadic naïve realism, on which perception is a relation between subject and object, 
and polyadic naïve realism, on which perception also includes so-called ‘standpoint 
conditions’ or ‘third relata.’ I then argue that neither has the resources to explain much about 
cognitive penetration. In section V, I reject what I take to be the most promising response that 
naïve realists can give to this challenge: rethink the cognitive penetrability of perception as a 
more mundane case of cognitive-to-cognitive penetration. Section VI concludes with 
clarifying remarks. 
 
II. Representationalist and Naïve Realist Theories of Perception 
Two views on the nature of perceptual experiences are currently popular. According to 
representationalists, perceptual experiences are roughly akin to beliefs insofar as they 
represent the world as being some way (Dretske 1995; Lycan 1996; Tye 1995; Byrne 2009; 
Pautz 2010; Siegel 2010; Nanay 2015). For example, in believing Nathan to be tall, you are 
in a state that represents Nathan as being tall. Beliefs attribute properties. Your belief that 
Nathan is tall attributes to Nathan the property ‘tallness’ and in that respect your belief has 
content. In having content, beliefs can be accurate or inaccurate. Such is the nature of a 
representation.5 Think of a sketch, a map or a newspaper report. These all represent, and in 
doing so can misrepresent. Representations misrepresent when they misattribute properties. If 
Nathan is short, then your belief that he is tall, along with the sketch that you draw of him on 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																												
 
5  I restrict focus here to representations with so-called ‘mind to world’ direction of fit. 
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the basis of that belief, misrepresent him; they both attribute to him a property, ‘being tall’, 
that he doesn’t in fact posses. 
 
Representationalists find it natural to extend this thinking to perceptual experiences. On their 
view, perceptual experiences also represent the world as being some way and so can be 
assessed for accuracy. In particular, in the case of veridical perceptual experiences, there is a 
fact of match between perceptual experience and world. Representationalists take it that this 
way of talking is only accounted for if perceptual experiences have representational content, 
and so are states whose nature is to report on what the mind-independent world is like. 
Consider the following remarks by Bence Nanay: 
 
Many of our mental states are representations: my belief that it is raining outside 
represents a putative state of affairs: that it is raining outside. If I am afraid of a tiger, 
this fear is also directed at, or is about, something: a tiger. In other words, many 
mental states refer to something, they are about something: they have content. But 
then it is tempting to assume that perceptual states are also representations: they also 
have content: if I see a cat, it would be natural to say that my perceptual state is about 
this cat. (2015: 153-154) 
 
 
Consider how this thinking extends to non-veridical perceptual experiences. For instance, 
suppose that there is a white swan before you. In low-level lighting conditions the swan may 
look black. The representationalist holds that it is intuitive to think of your visual experience 
now as inaccurate; that is, as misreporting on the colour properties of the swan insofar as the 
swan is white, not black. In hallucinating a white swan your perceptual experience is even 
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more in error: it wrongly represents the presence of an object that is absent. On standard 
varieties of representationalism, whether you veridically see a white swan, are under an 
illusion of there being a while swan, or are hallucinating one, there is a common mental state 
present which types these situations as fundamentally the same, and which may be exploited 
to explain their indistinguishability (Pautz 2010); in all three, you are in a situation in which 
you perceptually represent there to be a white swan before you. The difference between the 
experiences is merely a difference in how you are caused to token that experience: via the 
actual presence of a white swan in the veridical case versus a different causal story in the case 
of non-veridical experiences, e.g., direct stimulation of the visual cortices in the case of 
hallucination.  
 
When it comes to explaining perception’s phenomenal character, representationalists appeal 
to representational content; that is, the sum total of properties represented by the experience. 
For instance, why does seeing a red tomato differ, experientially, from seeing a yellow 
lemon? The representationalist’s answer is that the first represents such properties as, e.g., 
‘redness’ and ‘roundness’, etc. In the second, it represents a different set of properties, e.g., 
‘yellowness’ and ‘ovoidness’, etc. Granted, there are many significant dimensions along 
which representationalists disagree, a wholly uniform characterisation of the position is 
unnecessary for my purposes.6 
 
																																								 																				
6  Representationalists disagree over whether to identify the phenomenal character of 
perception with its representational content (strong/pure representationalism), or whether 
there is instead some relation between the two which is weaker than identity: mere 
supervenience, say (weak/impure representationalism). A view closely related to it agrees 
that perceptual experiences are representational mental states, but not exhaustively since 
perception’s representational content suffices to determine its phenomenal character. Instead, 
defenders of the latter view invoke qualia, understood as purely sensational, non-
representational properties, in order to explain this aspect of perception (Peacocke 1983; 
Block 1996). 
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The naïve realist rejects the above picture (Campbell 2002; Martin 2004; Travis 2004; Fish 
2009; Antony 2011; Brewer 2011; Kalderon 2011; Logue 2012). In particular, they deny the 
twofold analogy between perception and belief affirmed by the representationalist. First, 
perceptual experiences, as the naïve realist understands them, do not have representational 
contents as part of their fundamental nature. Second, perceptual experiences are not mental 
states that, like beliefs, can be conceptually cleaved from their objects. Whereas 
representationalists understand perceptual experiences to be purely psychic states that are 
distinct from their objects, albeit caused by them when veridical and potentially present in 
those objects’ absence, the naïve realist holds that perceptual experiences are constituted by 
such objects and so are relations between subjects and the mind-independent world. Thus, on 
naïve realism, the visual experience that you currently enjoy is not something which can be 
understood apart from the objects in the scene before you, and is partly made up by them.  
 
This means that, for the naïve realist, the connection between perceptual experience and 
world is much tighter than on representationalism. This is claimed by naïve realists to be 
mirrored in perceptual phenomenology: in seeing the scene before you, you are seemingly not 
able to introspect your perceptual experiences as items that are distinct from, yet causally 
connected to, the objects in the scene before you; rather, all that is present to consciousness is 
the world itself. This is then taken to vindicate the naïve realist’s account of the structure of 
perception insofar as their view is precisely that in perception the subject and the world form 
a relational unity (Snowdon 1990; Martin 2002b; Kennedy 2009).7 This means that whatever 
mental state you are in when you hallucinate, that state is not a perceptual experience, since it 
																																								 																				
7  Though see Soteriou (2013: ch5) for a naïve realist who denies that perception is 
wholly transparent in this manner. 
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is in the nature of a perceptual experience to relate a subject to their environment and that, by 
definition, does not occur in hallucination.8  
 
Some names for the world-involving relation at the heart of naïve realism include 
‘acquaintance’, ‘detection’, ‘a taking in’, ‘presentation’, ‘sensory awareness’, and more 
besides. Notice that perceptual experiences themselves have no propositional or semantic 
structure, on this view. For relations hold or they do not. They are not the sorts of things that 
be true or false, accurate or inaccurate. If perception can be said to be structured at all, on 
naïve realism, then its structure is simply the worldly objects perceived, or perhaps those 
objects plus features of the perceiving subject. (This is a key matter that I return to in IV.) 
 
How does a theory like this account for the phenomenal character of perception? It appeals to 
the worldly objects perceived. Here is an oft-quoted remark by John Campbell: 
 
[T]he phenomenal character of your experience, as you look around the room, is 
constituted by the actual layout of the room itself: which particular objects are there, 
their intrinsic properties, such as color and shape, and how they are arranged in 
relation to one another and to you. (2002: 116) 
 
 
Whereas the representationalist holds that seeing a tomato differs in phenomenal character 
from seeing a lemon due to differences in represented properties, e.g., redness and roundness 
																																								 																				
8  What the naïve realist should say about illusion is an even more complex affair. A 
selection of options includes: (i) typing illusions with hallucinations as fundamentally 
different in nature from veridical perceptions (Martin 2004); (ii) typing illusions with 
veridical perception and so collapsing the veridical/illusory distinction as standardly 
understood (Travis 2004; Antony 2011; Brewer 2011; Kalderon 2011); or (iii) holding a 
mixed view (Fish 2009).  
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versus yellowness and ovoidity, the naïve realist’s explanation is the two differ by virtue of 
the subject being related in each to different particular objects, each instantiating differing 
properties. Following Campbell’s quote, the naïve realist holds that the perceiving of a 
tomato has the phenomenal character that it does because of facts about the tomato, its 
properties, rather than because of purely psychic facts about the perceiver. (Again, this is a 
somewhat delicate matter to which I return in IV.) 
 
Having outlined what I take the disagreement between naïve realism and representationalism 
to fundamentally consist in, let us see what account each can give of cognitive penetration.9 
 
 
III. Cognitive Penetration and Representational Content 
Here are our earlier-discussed cases of cognitive penetration: 
 
• Make-perceive: the partial constitution of a perceptual experience by mental 
imagery. 
• The synchronic cognitive penetration of a perceptual experience via the causal 
influence of an occurently formed belief. 
• The diachronic cognitive penetration of a perceptual experience via the causal 
influence of, or partial constitution by, concepts. 
																																								 																				
9  Needless to say, the differences between representationalism and naïve realism that I 
focus on here are not always adhered to. Some affirm a hybrid view on which perception is 
both relational and representational; I return to these theories, briefly, in the conclusion. 
What’s more, some ways of understanding perceptual content render it relational (Burge 
1991; Schellenberg 2011). In addition, some of those who think of perceptual experiences in 
representational terms are not happy with the suggestion that this makes such states belief-
like, since they deny that perception is a propositional attitude (Crane 2009). 
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• Absence perception: a perceptual experience of an object’s absence that causally 
arises from, or is partially constituted by, a failure of match between working memory 
and perceptual stimuli. 
 
In cognitive penetration, as I understand it, a non-perceptual state causally influences, or 
partially constitutes, a perceptual experience. What is more, the non-perceptual state is one 
with representational content (or, in the case of concepts, can be thought of as an element of 
such states, beliefs in particular). Let us examine make-perceive, cognitive penetration and 
absence perception in greater detail. I leave discussion of what I call here ‘diachronic 
cognitive penetration’ for the following section on naïve realism, since it is a case of 
cognitive penetration that at least two naïve realists have discussed and take themselves able 
to explain. It will be my aim to show that they fail to do so. 
 
III.i – Make-Perceive 
Consider the mental act of visualising a bookcase. This act can be understood in either one of 
two ways. First, one can understand the act in terms of the tokening of an image of a 
bookcase in purely phenomenal space, ‘the mind’s eye’, as when day-dreaming. 
Alternatively, one can understand the act in terms of the tokening of an image which is 
represented as being located in one’s actual egocentric space. For instance, one may visualise 
a bookcase as being in the corner of this very room, say, as in Arranging Furniture.  
 
It is this second way of tokening the image that I want to focus on. It may be a bookcase one 
imagines, i.e. no particular bookcase. Alternatively, one may visualise one’s own bookcase, 
i.e. a particular object. Either way, the visual image of a bookcase is a state with content. 
Consider the case of visualizing a particular bookcase. Here, a particular object is represented 
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by imagination as as being some way, e.g., as having a certain size, shape and perhaps colour. 
The visual image can be accurate or inaccurate. Maybe you ‘mis-image’ the height of your 
bookcase when visualising it to be in the corner of the room, only noticing the error when 
attempting to move it to that location. Alternatively, you might ‘image’ the bookcase 
correctly, bringing about a fact of match between the image and its object.   
 
Above I said that one’s seeing this room to be a potential location for a bookcase is partially 
constituted by the projecting of a mental image of the bookcase into the room. But the 
relationship between the image of the bookcase and one’s (plain vanilla) visual experience of 
the room is so tight that, in this case at least, the explanatory relation seems to run in the other 
direction as well. For, just as part of what it is to see this room as a potential location for a 
bookcase is for one to mentally project into the room an image of the bookcase, what 
projecting the image into the room seems to first depend upon is one’s (plain vanilla) seeing 
the room. Without mentally projecting the bookcase, one couldn’t see the room in the way 
being described. But without first seeing the room (in the plain vanilla sense), one could not 
obviously be said to project the bookcase out into egocentric space. 
 
If visual experience has representational content, then this case of cognitive penetration is 
made prima facie intelligible. The partial constitution of one’s visual experience of the room 
as a location for a bookcase by mental imagery can be explained, at least in part, by both 
one’s (plain vanilla) visual experience of the room and one’s mental image of the bookcase 
being representational mental states; that is, in terms of both states having the same format. 
Clearly, to give a full account of this integration one would need to say a great deal about the 
mental activity involved in projecting the image into egocentric space. Crucially, however, 
understanding both states to be representations supplies a framework within which to develop 
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that account, since understanding both states to be representations renders their constitutive 
integration minimally comprehensible. That is, it goes some way to explaining how it is 
possible for one to token an image of a bookcase within (plain vanilla) visual experience, so 
that it becomes a visual experience of the room as a potential location for a bookcase, to be 
told that the image and the (plain vanilla) visual experience are mental states of the same 
fundamental nature. In this episode of make-perceive, one’s (plain vanilla) seeing of the room 
comes to be about not just the room, but also the bookcase. It is natural to say that the 
transformation is, in part, a matter of visual experience acquiring an additional content from 
the content the mental image.  
 
III.ii – Synchronic Cognitive Penetration 
Beliefs, as already noted, are paradigm examples of representational mental states. Your 
belief in Dinner Party that you are eating pigeon is a state that represents the world as being 
some way; in particular, it represents the meat that you are eating as being pigeon. The state 
can be accurate or inaccurate. If your boss was joking when she asserted that the meat is 
pigeon, then your belief is inaccurate. It gets wrong a certain fact about the world; or, more 
precisely, a certain fact about what is in your mouth. 
 
If your gustatory experience of the meat is also one with representational content—if it 
represents the meat as being some way—we thereby make it prima facie intelligible how the 
content of your belief about the meat can have a direct causal impact upon your perceptual 
experience of the meat: the former has that impact because its representational content affects 
the latter’s representational content. Again, a shared representational framework across 
perception and belief offers a minimally explanatory framework that, while falling short of 
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accounting for all the details of cognitive penetration, begins to make intelligible how a belief 
can causally influence a perceptual experience.  
 
A related idea has been defended by Zenon Pylyshyn, who first coined the term ‘cognitive 
penetration.’ Pylyshyn argues that cognitive penetration requires that beliefs have a 
“semantically coherent” (1999: 343) influence upon perception on the basis that causal 
influence is insufficient. While this idea has not gone unchallenged (Stokes 2013), it has been 
robustly defended by Fiona Macpherson (2012: 26; 2017: 9-10), and is often claimed to be 
partially definitive of the phenomenon (Wu 2013; Brogaard & Gatzia 2015; Lupyan 2015a; 
Teng 2016; Gross 2017; Burnston forthcoming; Fridland forthcoming). In particular, 
Macpherson argues that the semantic coherence condition can help distinguish cases of 
cognitive penetration from cases like the following: 
 
Important Exam You wake up believing that today is the day of an important 
exam. This belief causes you to get stressed out and anxious, 
thereby bringing on a migraine. The migraine involves various 
disturbances in your visual field; you experience strobing lights 
in the periphery of your vision. 
 
Intuitively, Important Exam differs from Dinner Party in its not being a case of cognitive 
penetration. Although it is an example of a belief causally influencing a perceptual 
experience, examples of such influences are rife and do not automatically count as cognitive 
penetration. (For instance, believing that the person in front of you at the supermarket 
checkout is your favourite musician, you might look at them for longer than you would 
otherwise.)  
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As Macpherson points out, if there is a semantic coherence condition on cognitive 
penetration, then we can easily explain why Important Exam fails to be a case of cognitive 
penetration: namely, that unlike in Dinner Party, there is no intelligible connection between 
the content of your belief and the change that it brings about to your visual experience. 
Although we know that believing a stressful event to be impending can cause migraines and 
visual disturbances, there is nothing here that makes these changes to your vision intelligible 
in the sense of its being rational or reasonable for your visual experience to be that way in 
light of your migraine. Contrast this with Dinner Party. It seems quite reasonable that you 
would experience the food in your mouth to be slimier and sourer than before, upon coming 
to believe that you are eating pigeon, coupled with your background belief that pigeon are 
disease-ridden vermin.   
 
I said above that the semantic coherence condition on cognitive penetration is related to my 
suggestion that synchronic cognitive penetration is made intelligible by both the penetrating 
belief and penetrated perceptual experience being states with representational content. How, 
precisely, are the two claims related? The answer is simple: one can explain, in part, what the 
semantic coherence condition amounts to if one assumes that both perceptual experiences and 
beliefs are states with representational content. In effect, the semantic coherence condition on 
cognitive penetration may be understood as having this as a prior condition: that the 
penetrating and penetrated states have representational content. Consider, in this regard, 
Steven Gross’s comments on semantic coherence:  
 
A central feature of propositional attitudes is that they do directly affect one another 
in semantically coherent ways. Indeed, their availability for rational inference about 
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what to believe and what to do—and the conceptual structure this imposes upon 
them—is among their most important functional features. If perceptual states… 
interacted with propositional attitudes in a similar way, this would be a strong 
argument for a crucial continuity with them. (2017: np) 
 
 
The so-called ‘continuity’ between perception and cognition that cognitive penetration is 
often taken to motivate is the very strong one that the very distinction between perception 
and cognition may collapse (Shea 2014; Lupyan 2015b). The continuity between perception 
and cognition that I am motivating here as a partial explanation of synchronic cognitive 
penetration (via its explaining, in part, what semantic coherence amounts to) is a much 
weaker one. However, it significance for our understanding the fundamental nature of 
perception is far from insignificant, since it is that both are representational mental states, i.e. 
have semantic content. 
 
III.iii – Absence Perception 
Perhaps the most controversial case of cognitive penetration that I focus on here is absence 
perception: seeing (or hearing, or smelling, or feeling, or tasting) an object to be missing. In 
Missing Laptop you see your laptop to be missing. If we accept that such perceptual 
experiences are possible, we will want to know how they are possible. A plausible 
‘expectational mechanism’ that explains at least some such experiences is memory-
perception mismatching (Farennikova 2013; 2015).10 First, an image (or object-template), 
which encodes visual properties of an object, O, is tokened in working memory via the 
registering of contextual, environmental cues. Once tokened, the template is projected in 
																																								 																				
10  This mechanism may not explain all cases of absence perception. See Martin & Dokic 
(2013), Roberts (2016) and Cavedon-Taylor (2017) for some alternatives. 
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order to be matched against further incoming perceptual stimuli. Such projecting is described 
as “a process of holding up the template of a searched object for the purpose of comparison 
of its perceptual attributes with the attributes of the perceived scene.” (2013: 441) If there is a 
mismatch, i.e. if the projected template of O fails to refer to any object in the perceived scene, 
the result is that O, e.g., the laptop, is seen to be absent.  
 
If perceptual experiences have representational content, then there is a framework within 
which to account for the matching that goes on in absence perception and which, crucially, 
explains why the failure of the matching task results in a perceptual experience of absence. 
The object-template of the laptop that is tokened in working memory is a state with 
representational content. It represents your laptop. If the visual experience you have of the 
surface of the desk is one with representational content, then we can make sense of the 
possibility of a failure of match between the two in terms of a failure of match in content. 
Unless the memory state were of broadly the same nature as the visual experience, one might 
think that we would not be able to explain why the failure of match should result in a 
perceptual experience of something’s being missing. Indeed, without the two being 
representations, one might think that talk of ‘matching’ and ‘non-matching’ wouldn’t make 
sense.  
 
I want to stress at this point that none of the above shows that a shared representational 
framework across cognition and perception is sufficient for explaining cognitive penetration. 
Indeed, that sufficiency claim is false. Your current perceptual experience is unlikely to be 
penetrated, either causally or constitutively, by your beliefs about, e.g., basic arithmetic, what 
day today is, or that Cairo is the capital city of Egypt, etc. At most, what I’ve said above 
supplies reason to believe that a shared representational framework is one (of no doubt many) 
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background necessary conditions for cognitive penetration. Still, it would be a highly 
significant one, since we have seen that this is not the naïve realist’s account of the 
fundamental nature of perception. It is also worth stressing that the claims offered so far do 
not (at least yet) even establish this necessity claim. Since, for all I have said, the naïve realist 
framework may supply an account that similarly explains important aspects of cognitive 
penetration, and that account may even be preferable to one that invokes perceptual 
representations. It is to their account that I now turn.  
 
IV. Cognitive Penetration Without Perceptual Representation? 
In section II, I characterised naïve realism as the thesis that perceptual experience is a relation 
between a subject and mind-independent object. With that in mind, let us consider the 
following formulation of the view: 
 
Dyadic naïve realism:  S’s perceptual experience of the scene before them is 
exhaustively constituted by the particular objects and property 
instances of which that scene is comprised. 
 
Although I use the term ‘dyadic’ here, it is important to be clear that the view explains the 
nature and phenomenal character of perceptual experiences by reference to only one 
constituent of the relation: the object of perception. (The rationale for calling the view 
‘dyadic’ will emerge shortly, given Campbell’s (2009) view reproduced below.) Naïve 
realism is commonly glossed in just this way, with the perceived object doing the heavy-
lifting. Recall Campbell’s (2002) remark: “[T]he phenomenal character of your experience, 
as you look around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room itself.” Consider 
as well how Tim Crane and Craig French introduce the view in a survey article:  
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Take the churchyard covered in white snow and suppose one sees this for what it is. 
Why is this a case of things appearing white to one? Here the naive realist appeals to 
the real presence in the experience of the white snow itself. The character of one’s 
experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in 
experience.  (2017: np, emphasis my own) 
 
 
But dyadic naïve realism is arguably too naïve (as Crane & French and Campbell recognise). 
Indeed, Campbell (2009: 657-659) has more recently suggested that a full characterisation of 
the structure and phenomenology of a subject’s perceptual experience must include a number 
of further elements. Campbell calls the total ensemble of such elements a ‘standpoint’ or 
‘point of view.’ It includes: 
 
• The sense modality used to perceive. 
• The particular place in which the perceiving occurs. 
• The particular time at which the perceiving occurs. 
• The subject’s distance from the perceived object.  
• The relative orientations of the subject and/or object. 
• The temporal dynamics of the experience, including movement of the object or 
perceiver. 
 
Campbell thus writes:  
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We should think of [perceptual] consciousness of the object not as a two-place 
relation between a person and an object, but as a three-place relation between a 
person, a standpoint and an object. You always experience an object from a 
standpoint. And you can experience one and the same object from different 
standpoints. (2009: 657, emphasis my own) 
 
 
With these extra factors now introduced, let us define, in a highly schematic way, a different 
version of naïve realism: 
 
Polyadic naïve 
realism:  
S’s perceptual experience of the scene before them is 
exhaustively constituted by the particulars and property instances 
of which that scene is comprised, as well as further, relevant 
relata. 
 
I have deliberately left underspecified the standpoint conditions. One reason for doing so is 
that different naïve realists may wish to formulate the view with different relata. For example, 
polyadic naïve realism is affirmed by both Bill Brewer (2011) and William Fish (2009), 
though the latter does not explicitly talk in terms of standpoints. While Brewer’s formulation 
is exceptionally close to Campbell’s,11 Fish’s focus is on such things as visual acuity (Ibid: 
																																								 																				
11  One difference is that Brewer’s view has it that the standpoint conditions play 
something of an additive role, in part explaining the instantiation of sensible properties. On 
Campbell’s view, they play a sectional role, making revealed certain prior instantiations (see 
French (2014) for an insightful discussion, but then see fn11 below). Moreover, Campbell’s 
view, but not Brewer’s, is couched in Fregean terms. One might also see Johnston (2004) as 
having an additive account of standpoints since Johnston believes that in illusion (and 
hallucination) one comes to be perceptually related to properties, albeit uninstantiated ones; 
presumably Johnston would think that this can happen as a result of one’s cognitive states.  
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55-56) and attention (Ibid: 64). For example, what it is like for Nathan to see a white swan is 
determined not only by the swan itself, his spatial relation to it, his visual acuity, and so on, 
but also how he distributes his attention over the animal. Fish’s solution to this potential 
difficulty is to factor attention into perception by considering it too to be part of the 
standpoint conditions (see also Brewer 2013).12 
 
Taking stock, it appears that the polyadic naïve realist can employ a simple two-step strategy 
in order to explain seemingly troublesome variations in perceptual phenomenal character, 
whether between different subjects perceiving the same object at the same time or between 
the same subject perceiving the same object at different times: 
 
Step one:  isolate the factor that is responsible for the variation in 
phenomenal character, e.g., visual acuity, attention, etc. 
 
Step two:  include that factor as part of the standpoint/third relatum. 
 
																																								 																				
12  One might wonder whether this concept of a ‘standpoint’ is in good order. In 
particular, there is significant ambiguity about whether it is an object of perception or a 
background, shaping condition of that relation (whether playing an additive or selectional 
function). Going by Campbell’s list, standpoint conditions include such things as the 
subject’s distance from the perceived object and the orientation of that object. These are 
naturally taken to fall on the side of what is perceived rather than on the side of the newly-
introduced relatum, i.e. the standpoint, whose intended role is to modify how the object is 
perceived (Campbell 2014: 51). French’s (2014: 400) characterisation of Campbell’s 
standpoint as selectional is thus not wholly accurate. It would be more accurate to say that 
standpoints, on Campbell’s view, play both a selectional and presentational role in 
perception, whether or not Campbell recognises it. Moreover, many of these standpoint 
factors, e.g., the sense modality used, may already be accounted for by a two-place 
conception of perceptual experiences that gives equal, or near-equal, weight to both relata 
(see Logue 2012; Soteriou 2013: ch5). For the sake of argument, I will assume that these 
ambiguities can be overcome via a more perspicuous account of the inter-relations of the 
relevant relata (but see Cassam 2014 for further worries). 
 
 24 of 33 
Now let us consider what dyadic and polyadic naïve realism have to say about cognitive 
penetration.13  
 
First, it is clear that dyadic naïve realism leaves no room for, and is seemingly inconsistent 
with, cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, the phenomenal character of perceptual 
experience is altered without a corresponding alteration to the object of perception. For 
instance, in Dinner Party, what it is like for you to taste the food in your mouth, prior to 
forming the belief that it is pigeon you are eating, differs from what it is like for you to taste 
that same food while affirming this belief. Cognitive penetration is not accommodated by this 
view since it affirms that perception’s phenomenal character is exhaustively characterised by 
external objects and their properties. This leaves no room for anything else, like mental 
imagery, beliefs, concepts or memories, to affect perception’s phenomenal character 
(compare Block 2010: fn.8). Insofar as one thinks that there are such cases of cognitive 
penetration, one should prefer representationalism. For representationalism, we have seen, is 
not merely consistent with cognitive penetration, it provides a framework that begins to make 
comprehensible various types of the phenomenon.  
 
By contrast, it appears that polyadic naïve realism does provide a framework for 
accommodating cognitive penetration. In cognitive penetration, factors putatively external to 
perception alter its phenomenal character. That is precisely what the two-step strategy 
highlighted above is meant to aid the naïve realist in explaining. The standpoint, or third-
relatum, can simply be further expanded to include mental imagery, beliefs, concepts, 
																																								 																				
13  There are other ways in which to cash out the distinction between dyadic and polyadic 
naïve realism. Block (2010) calls the former ‘naïve realism’ and the latter ‘direct realism’. 
Mehta & Ganson (2016) call dyadic naïve realism ‘clean phenomenal particularism.’ See 
Logue (2012) and French (2014) for others distinctions one can make between versions of the 
theory. 
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memories, etc. so that what is putatively outside of perception becomes a part of it. Polyadic 
naïve realism, by its very nature, seems to make room for cognitive penetration: mental 
imagery, beliefs, concepts, memories, etc. can be folded into perception by their being 
elements that, along with attention, acuity, sense modality, etc., constitutively shape the 
nature and phenomenology of perceptual relations to external objects. As Brewer puts it, 
though not in relation to cognitive penetration per se: “experiential variations… may all 
perfectly adequately be accounted for by variations within this third relatum.” (2013: 424; 
2011: 96) 
 
But there is a problem here. Contrary to appearances, this two-step strategy says very little 
that is explanatory of how representational states may alter perceptual experiences, whether 
causally or constitutively. Polyadic naïve realists would seek to explain cognitive penetration 
in terms of the penetrating states being extra relata, over and above the objects in the scene, 
the subject’s spatial relation to those objects, their visual acuity/attention, etc. The difficulty 
is that this merely stipulates, rather than explains, the alteration of a subject’s perceptual 
experiences by their non-perceptual ones. Cognitive penetration, on this model, does not get 
illuminated in even the minimal sense that it does on representationalism; that is, by reference 
to the shared representational nature which can account for such things as, e.g., the semantic 
coherence condition on synchronic cognitive penetration (as in Dinner Party) and the fact of 
mis-match in cases of absence perception (as in Missing Laptop). Polyadic naïve realists 
who would invoke the two-step strategy in order to account for cognitive penetration end up, 
by all appearances, taking for granted, rather than explicating, the phenomenon.  
 
In addition, given the naïve realist’s account of the fundamental nature of perception, i.e. as a 
non-representational relation, the causal or constitutive integration of perceptual experiences 
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with representational states is not something that they are at liberty to simply help themselves 
to. On the naïve realist’s view, perceptual experiences have a nature that is crucially distinct 
from the nature of cognitive states: they are presentations or relations, not representations 
with content. This is part of the reason why attempting to cash out cognitive penetration in 
terms of standpoints and third relata fails to be something that itself explains, but which itself 
calls out for explanation. What one wants to know is: how do representational states of mind 
get to be part of the motley crew of standpoint conditions for non-representational 
perception? Polyadic naïve realism, is thus not only uninformative regarding the basic ‘how’ 
of cognitive penetration, it is uninformative in the face of significant pressure for some 
further explanation. 
 
As an example of this problem, consider Fish’s (2009) and Johnston’s (2006) claims 
regarding the influence of concepts on perception, as in diachronic cases like Jeweller. Fish 
claims that the subject’s concepts, no less than their visual acuity and attention, determine the 
nature and phenomenology of perceptual experiences. Both Fish and Johnston affirm that 
while low-level properties do not require corresponding concepts for their perception, high-
level ones, e.g., natural and artefactual kinds, are only perceived via concept-possession. 
Johnston writes: 
 
Conceptual sophistication helps us to use our senses to mine the scene, or more 
generally the scenario before the senses, for relevant exemplifications—his bluffing, 
her raising, your having a busted straight. (2006: 283) 
 
Similarly, Fish (2009: 70) claims that a subject has the capacity to “pick up” the property of a 
thing’s being a shoe, a computer, etc. only if the subject has the concepts SHOE, COMPUTER, 
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etc. What Fish has in mind is that acquiring these concepts alters one’s perceptual 
experiences of shoes and computers such that one can perceive them as such, i.e. as shoes or 
as computers. 
 
Yet the very thing the naïve realist needs to explain is what picking up or mining an object for 
a property, via concept possession, amounts to. What is problematic is not so much how to 
unpack these analogies. That is straightforward: concepts allow perceivers to be perceptually 
related to properties they would not be perceptually related to otherwise. The difficulty comes 
at an earlier step: explaining how the subject’s conceptual repertoire gets integrated into 
perception to begin with. Conceiving of a subject’s concepts as things that ‘constitutively 
shape’ their perceptual relations to objects, or which are ‘aspects of the standpoint 
conditions’, is not explanatory, but stands in need of explanation. In particular, it stands in 
need of explanation given the naïve realist’s account of perception as non-representational.14 
 
If what I have said here is right, then cognitive penetration favours representational content. 
Representational content does not, by itself, explains all facets of cognitive penetration. 
Rather, perception’s having representational content provides an explanatory framework 
within which to develop the complete story about the causal, or constitutive, integration of 
representational states with perception that is definitive of the phenomenon. (This is perhaps 
clearest in the case of the semantic condition on synchronic cognitive penetration.) The 
suggestion is that representational content be thought of as a background necessary condition 
for cognitive penetration. It is certainly not the only such condition, but if what I have said 
																																								 																				
14  Berit Brogaard and Bartek Chomanski (2015: 481) also object to the naïve realist’s 
inclusion of concepts in perception to explain high-level perception. They write “The idea 
that cognitive processes directly determine which property instances get picked out does not 
seem to be in the spirit of naïve realism.” This objection is misplaced. At best, their remarks 
are true only of dyadic naïve realism. It precisely in keeping with the spirit of polyadic naïve 
realism to factor such elements into perceptual experience (see Brewer 2013: 424; 2011: 96). 
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here is right, it is a significant one insofar as it provides an important lesson for the correct 
metaphysics of perception.  
 
V. Cognitive Penetration Rethought 
What might the naïve realist say in reply to this challenge? Perhaps the most promising reply 
would be to claim that cognitive penetration occurs not within perception itself, but is a 
matter of representational states causally, or constitutively, affecting the content of other 
representational states, ones that are closely-associated with perceptual experiences, but 
which are strictly post-perceptual. The shape of this proposal echoes a currently popular 
strategy that naïve realists have adopted for explaining perceptual illusions: the error is not in 
perception itself, since perception is mere passive presentation, but in the forming of certain 
contentful states from perception (Travis 2004; Antony 2011; Brewer 2011; Kalderon 2011). 
Here, what has been claimed to be a perceptual phenomenon is rethought in terms of a purely 
cognitive one. Likewise, the thought might go that one can say the same about cognitive 
penetration. 
 
At best, this strategy will have mixed success. For instance, one should grant that cases of 
diachronic cognitive penetration, as in Jeweller, could coherently be understood to involve 
concepts affecting post-perceptual states, rather than perceptual ones (see Reiland 2014). 
However, it is instructive to note that this is not what is claimed by Johnston and Fish. The 
most natural reading of Johnston’s claim that concepts affect the “use our senses to mine the 
scene, or more generally the scenario before the senses,” (2006: 283) is that concepts 
integrate with perceptual experiences themselves. In the case of Fish (2009), it is clearer still 
that concepts are being said to affect perceptual experiences. Fish places concepts in the same 
boat at attention and visual acuity; that is, as factors that shape the nature and phenomenology 
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of perceptual experiences, not anything post-perceptual. Put in Brewer’s (2011) and 
Campbell’s (2009) terms, Fish’s view is straightforwardly that concepts are part of 
perception’s third-relatum or standpoint conditions. Thus, both Johnston and Fish are to be 
read as attempting to explain high-level property perception within the naïve realist 
framework. So while the strategy of rethinking the cognitive penetrability of perception in 
purely cognitive terms may be coherent (at least for diachronic cases), it is not friendly to 
already-existing naïve realist accounts of the phenomenon. 
 
Rethinking the cognitive penetrability of perception as a purely cognitive phenomenon fares 
less well for other types of cognitive penetration. Consider make-perceive, as in Arranging 
Furniture. Visualising the bookcase in this or that corner of the room is not happily 
understood to be a matter of combining an image of a bookcase with a contentful state 
formed post-perceptually. What the bookcase image is most naturally taken to integrate with 
is one’s perceptual experience of the room itself. As discussed above, unless the bookcase-
image were to constitutively penetrate one’s (plain vanilla) perceptual experience of the 
room, the very act of projecting the image into egocentric space becomes mysterious. And 
again, there are naïve realists who discuss this very phenomenon in terms that suggest they 
consider it to be a perceptual one (Martin 2002b: 140). 
 
Finally, compare the case of cognitive penetration by memory mentioned at the beginning of 
this paper: tactually experiencing an object’s 3-D shape in virtue of memory unifying your 
temporally extended hand-movements over that object’s surface. If one interprets this, and 
similar examples, as cases that are purely intra-cognitive, then one risks being left with a very 
thin and uninteresting notion of tactual experience itself. Without concepts and memory 
being causally relevant for, or constitutively woven into, tactual experiences, sensory 
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awareness in this modality becomes seemingly restricted to spatially and temporally disjoint 
points of contact between one’s skin and an object’s surface. One one will miss out on many 
ordinary tactual experiences that require memory in order to become temporally unified. 
Consider, e.g., tactually sensing there to be a flat surface before you via gliding your palm 
over it, tactually sensing the object in your pocket to be a ring via slipping a finger through it, 
or tactually sensing the curvature of your drinks glass via running your fingers down it. These 
temporally extended experiences are missing from a view on which memory cannot 
constitutively penetrate tactual perception itself. 
 
So, at best there are only some cases of cognitive penetration that the strategy under 
consideration might explain. But doing so will leave cold many naïve realists who are already 
committed to various types of the phenomenon being bona fide perceptual.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
I have claimed that those who favour a view of perception as subject to cognitive penetration 
by such representational states as, e.g., visual images, beliefs, concepts and memories, 
thereby have reason to think that perception also has representational content. Although it is 
natural to interpret this line of thinking as simply saying that cognitive penetration requires 
the truth of representationalism and the abandonment of naïve realism, that would be too 
quick. While one way to accommodate cognitive penetration would be to endorse 
representationalism, a number of philosophers have recently claimed that it is possible to 
affirm hybrid accounts of the nature of perception on which it is fundamentally both 
relational and representational (Bengson et al. 2011; Logue 2014; Cavedon-Taylor 2015). 
These impure forms of naïve realism or relationalism require further exploration, but they are 
not at all threatened by the arguments developed here. They aim to preserve central 
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phenomenological and epistemic insights that the naïve realist’s account of perception has to 
offer, e.g., in terms of explaining the phenomenal particularity of perception (Martin 2002a) 
and knowledge of reference (Campbell 2002), while having the additional explanatory 
benefits afforded by representational content. In this paper, I have outlined what seems to be 
one such benefit: a framework for explaining various aspects of cognitive penetration. 
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